Creationism is more defensible The view that inference can create justification is more defensible than most people give it credit for. Who disagrees? [Ed. note: So the hypertext is supposed to pique interest, but judging from my inbox, it’s also … Continue reading
Orange Beach, Alabama University of South Alabama May 11-14, 2009 Conference Website Keynote Speakers: William Lycan & Jonathan Kvanvig Invited Speakers: Mylan Engel, Erik Olsson, Bruce Russell, and Matthias Steup Interested in Participating? We welcome any philosophers interested in participating … Continue reading
Discussed at Experimental Philosophy, one study on bank cases and another on knowledge ascriptions being sensitive to practical concerns. The former is being done by Wesley Buckwalter and the latter by Mark Phelan and Ram Neta. The posts contain links … Continue reading
Suppose we are motivated to develop a theory of rationality because of our awareness of our own fallibility: truth isn’t transparent to us, and so what we should track as doxastic beings is signs or marks of truth, and a … Continue reading
Here are three principles of varying plausibility: 1. There can’t be any justified inconsistencies: propositions which are justified for a person and which logically imply a contradiction. 2. There can’t be any justified contradictories: no instances of p being justified … Continue reading
Have intuitions, will travel — but not very far this time without your help. Recent work by Peter Klein on benign falsehoods leads to the recognition of conflicting intuitions about testimonial knowledge in a particularly bewildering case for all parties … Continue reading
Prompted partly by Olsson’s recent Against Coherence (OUP 2005), I’ve been thinking about the truth-conduciveness of coherence. There’ve been two recent claims to prove that coherence cannot be truth conducive (in Olsson, and Bovens & Hartmann’s Bayesian Epistemology). I don’t … Continue reading
The restrictive view that collapses the distinction between epistemic permission and epistemic obligation is at odds with most versions of coherentism, and there’s an interesting reason why, I think. Suppose we begin with the assumption that knowledge and justification ultimately … Continue reading
I’m off to a philosophy of religion conference at Wheaton tomorrow. Keith and I are in the same session; maybe we’ll try to figure out what a contextualist view of hell would look like… In the meantime, I thought I’d … Continue reading
Hey, here’s a draft of my article on foundationalism & coherentism for the next Blackwell Companion: Foundations & Coherence Comments are welcome, including comments about what important things I’ve omitted (especially if I’ve omitted reference to an important work of … Continue reading