Can a subject’s beliefs, desires, fears, or goals causally influence the way things seem to her? Suppose that the answer is yes. That is, suppose that a subject’s mental states can penetrate the way things seem to her. What are … Continue reading
Here is my impression: it is very popular to allow certain kinds of experiences to provide (prima facie propositional) justification for certain propositions. Which propositions might an experience justify? The most straightforward thing to say is that certain experiences provide … Continue reading
I was talking with Matt McGrath yesterday about the following problem. If we consider ordinary epistemic principles such as “if you’re appeared to F-ly, without grounds for doubt, then it is reasonable to believe that something is F,” we can … Continue reading
Here’s a bit of a puzzle about memory. An ordinary view, in the language of modularity, is that the memory box contains propositions, and when one explicitly recalls something, one accesses such information from one’s memory box (though this claim … Continue reading
Matt McGrath sent me a note about memory that got me thinking a bit about it. I’ve never worked on memory, and haven’t checked the literature to see if this issue has been discussed, so this may already be out … Continue reading