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Daily Archives: April 20, 2007

A Simple Solution to the “Preface Paradox”

Posted on April 20, 2007 by Ralph WedgwoodApril 20, 2007
14

Many philosophers argue that paradoxes like the so-called “preface paradox” show that it is not a requirement of rationality that the contents of one’s beliefs should all be consistent with each other. (For example, David Christensen argues for this in … Continue reading →

Posted in epistemic paradoxes | 14 Replies

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