The department of philosophy at the university of Aberdeen (Scotland) is hosting an international conference on ‘moral contextualism’ on July 4-5 2006. Speakers will include Berit Brogaard, John Greco, John Hawthorne, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Alan Thomas, and Ralph Wedgwood. A part … Continue reading
Monthly Archives: March 2006
Dear FEWers, We apologize for the delay (and for some confusion) concerning the final schedule for FEW 2006. This was caused by an overwhelming response, and also by an email-listing snafu. We had so many submissions and queries about FEW … Continue reading
An Arché workshop on Basic Knowledge will take place in St Andrews on 24-25 November 2006. Speakers will include Jason Stanley, Duncan Pritchard and Jessica Brown. There will be a slot for a graduate student paper. Graduate students, and those … Continue reading
Back from the Pacific APA, where the program was the best I’ve ever seen. The program was so good that the only thing to complain about was that there were too many times where 2-3 wonderful sessions were occurring simultaneously. … Continue reading
Yesterday was the day: Joe Salerno revealed the source of the knowability paradox! It’s normally called Fitch’s Proof, because Fred Fitch first published it in 1963. But: Fitch says in a footnote that he owes the idea to an anonymous … Continue reading
[All the papers I’m about to mention are available on-line in one form or another here.] This is not primarily a piece of self-promotion intended to get more people to read more of my work — though of course I’d … Continue reading
Foley’s Swampman (Fs) arises out of the swamp, produced by a lightning, fully decorated with a vast array of true beliefs. Foley think Fs knows a lot more than we do, but many, probably most, have remained unconvinced. Mike made … Continue reading
Rich has a critical review of Hawthorne’s Knowledge and Lotteries here. Looks really interesting! … Continue reading
Most epistemologists recognize that many of the common informal fallacies are epistemically relevant in various ways. Thus, even though tu quoque arguments are irrelevant to the truth of the position being espoused, they are relevant epistemically because one way to … Continue reading
We’re hosting an international conference on Epistemic Value in Stirling on August 19th-20th this year. For more details, see the webpage here. Although this webpage is far from complete, it does have details of the keynote speakers and how to … Continue reading