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Monthly Archives: August 2004

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closure for justification and the order of inquiry

Posted on August 31, 2004 by Kvanvig JonAugust 31, 2004
7

Suppose one adopts a closure principle for justification of the following sort: CLOSURE: If S justifiably believes p and justifiably believes that p implies q, then S is justified in believing q. Justifiably believing implies believing, in this formulation, but … Continue reading →

Posted in epistemic paradoxes, justification | 7 Replies

Meta-evidence

Posted on August 30, 2004 by Kvanvig JonAugust 30, 2004
10

Consider the following principle, one lifted from the same Feldman piece that prompted the last post: Evidence that there is evidence for P is evidence for P. I’ll call this principle the “metaevidence” principle. According to this principle, no matter … Continue reading →

Posted in general | 10 Replies

Disagreement, Rationality, Epistemic Dilemmas, and Buridan’s Ass

Posted on August 29, 2004 by Kvanvig JonAugust 29, 2004
6

Rich Feldman is one of my very favorite epistemologists. Some of my respect is self-interested: I agree with a vast majority of his expressed epistemological views. But there’s more to it than just self-congratulation involved when I read his stuff. … Continue reading →

Posted in justification | 6 Replies

Openmindedness and a two-dimensional framework for belief

Posted on August 28, 2004 by Kvanvig JonAugust 28, 2004
Reply

The comments on my first post about openmindedness make me think that we might need a two dimensional framework for belief. One dimension is that standard Bayesian one of degree of belief. The other, central to the concept of openmindedness, … Continue reading →

Posted in virtue epistemology | Leave a reply

Openmindedness

Posted on August 27, 2004 by Kvanvig JonAugust 27, 2004
5

Wayne Riggs has a new paper up on his website that has me thinking about openmindedness again (by the way, Wayne, I think Greg Pappas had a piece on this topic once in the Peirce Transactions). Two questions are central … Continue reading →

Posted in understanding, virtue epistemology | 5 Replies

Foley and Swampman

Posted on August 25, 2004 by Kvanvig JonAugust 25, 2004
11

Fake Barn Country is having a lively discussion on Foley’s work, gypsy lawyer counterexamples as well as other topics in epistemology. Some of the discussion I’ve been part of as the lone defender of my illustrious mentor’s views, and I … Continue reading →

Posted in knowledge | 11 Replies

New book

Posted on August 25, 2004 by DeRoseAugust 25, 2004
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I just received in the mail from Blackwell my copy of the new book, Sosa and His Critics, featuring, of course, essays about CD’s own Ernest Sosa, many of them by CD-ers, the majority of them on Sosa’s epistemology, together … Continue reading →

Posted in general | Leave a reply

The Philosopher’s Carnival

Posted on August 24, 2004 by Kvanvig JonAugust 24, 2004
4

The first Philosopher’s Carnival, a collection of some items that have appeared on philosophy weblogs, is here. The plan, I believe, is to put up items every week or so at this site. … Continue reading →

Posted in general | 4 Replies

Littlejohn on Justification

Posted on August 23, 2004 by Kvanvig JonAugust 23, 2004
6

Clayton Littlejohn sent me an interesting email about justification, and with his permission I’m quoting it here so that our discussion can be available to others as well. Clayton’s questions are about the relationship between personal and doxastic justification, as … Continue reading →

Posted in justification | 6 Replies

Perception and Belief

Posted on August 23, 2004 by Kvanvig JonAugust 23, 2004
2

Think about traditional theories of perception, such as the theory of appearing, sense-data theories, or adverbial theories. Each of these theories is aimed at a metaphysical question, the issue of what the immediate object of perception is, if any (so … Continue reading →

Posted in perception | 2 Replies

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